Speed-Inferences From Other Evidence Cases Summarized By Personal Injury Lawyer

Fairfax Injury Lawyer Brien Roche Summarizes Speed-Inferences From Other Evidence Cases
Brien Roche

This page within Virginia Tort Case Law is a compilation of cases reported by the Virginia Supreme Court and summarized by Brien Roche dealing with the topic of Speed-Inferences From Other Evidence. For more information about traffic collisions see the pages on Wikipedia. 

Speed-Inferences From Other Evidence Cases

1983 Hogan v. Carter, 226 Va. 361, 310 S.E.2d 666.In this case there was evidence of excessive speed through testimony of witnesses. Court also noted that extensive damage to both cars was mute evidence of high speed at moment of impact.

1981 McManama v. Wilhelm, 222 Va. 335, 281 S.E.2d 813.Severity of injuries to decedent pedestrian was not, without further evidence, sufficient to establish excessive speed.

1977 Nicholaou v. Harrington, 217 Va. 618, 231 S.E.2d 318.Lay testimony estimated speed of plaintiff at 55 mph (10 mph over limit) when he was approximately 35 feet from scene of accident. For whatever weight jury accorded it, this evidence was admissible. Discussion of evidence of speed at various distances from scene.

1977 King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 231 S.E.2d 312.Witness who did not see vehicle in movement is incompetent to testify from sound alone as to speed. Moreover, evidence not admissible that driver was exceeding speed limit some ten miles from scene of collision. Discussion of evidence of speed at various distances from accident.

1976 Semones v. Johnson, 217 Va. 293, 227 S.E.2d 731.Estimates by witnesses of speed were within speed limit; however, physical evidence of skid marks and force of physical impact would support finding that defendant’s speed was excessive and proximately contributed to accident.

1975 Maxie v. Doe, 215 Va. 409, 211 S.E.2d 246.Witness testified contrary to plaintiff’s testimony, that plaintiff was exceeding speed limit when she passed him short time and distance before accident. Whether such evidence has probative value, is matter within sound discretion of trial court.

1970 Talley v. Draper Constr. Co., 210 Va. 618, 172 S.E.2d 763.Skid marks and damage to vehicle established excessive speed of plaintiff.

1967 John Doe v. Simmers, 207 Va. 956, 154 S.E.2d 146.John Doe uninsured motorist action; plaintiff forced off roadway by vehicle unknown to her. Plaintiff not negligent as matter of law, despite testimony that her speed was only 15 mph when she went onto shoulder and traveled some 15 feet. Shoulder wet; issue properly for jury.

1966 Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 146 S.E.2d 252.Witness estimated defendant’s speed at 60 to 65 mph 2.2 miles from accident scene. There is no inference that it was traveling at same speed at time of accident.

1965 Minter v. Clements, 206 Va. 403, 143 S.E.2d 847.There was insufficient evidence to allow jury to infer that plaintiff was traveling at unlawful speed due to location of vehicles after accident.

1965 Vought v. James, 205 Va. 719, 139 S.E.2d 810.Skids and distance plaintiff thrown raised question as to speed of defendant.

1964 Richardson v. Hackett, 204 Va. 847, 134 S.E.2d 312.Severe damage to vehicles and skid marks point to excess speed.

1956 Ketchmark v. Lindauer, 198 Va. 42, 92 S.E.2d 286.Distance that vehicle parts were thrown from vehicle was evidence of high rate of speed.

1953 Crabtree v. Dingus, 194 Va. 615, 74 S.E.2d 54.Physical evidence may under certain circumstance indicate excessive rate of speed but not in this case where car collides with concrete post.

1952 Hebner v. Sullivan, 194 Va. 259, 72 S.E.2d 689.Police officer testified that skid marks made by car showed nothing which would indicate any excessive speed.

1952 Sibley v. Slayton, 193 Va. 470, 69 S.E.2d 466.Physical evidence in this case does not permit inference that speed of vehicle was greater than that fixed by witnesses.

1952 McDowell v. Dye, 193 Va. 390, 69 S.E.2d 459.Physical evidence justified jury in concluding that witnesses had underestimated speed of vehicle.

1951 Mitchell v. Wilkerson, 193 Va. 121, 67 S.E.2d 912.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Physical facts such as sound of tires and force of impact warranted conclusion as to speed of vehicle.

1950 Sink v. Masterson, 191 Va. 618, 61 S.E.2d 863.Distance vehicle travelled after impact lends weight to inference that striking vehicle was going at considerable speed.

1950 Interstate Veneer Co. v. Edwards, 191 Va. 107, 60 S.E.2d 4.Distance traveled by vehicles and condition after impact is probative of speed of vehicles.

1950 Davis v. Webb, 190 Va. 997, 59 S.E.2d 116.In determining speed of vehicle jury may consider extent of damage to autos, distance, and course traveled after impact. However, it was improper to instruct jury on these factors to exclusion of other testimony bearing on speed of car.

1948 Mauser v. Hebb, 187 Va. 876, 48 S.E.2d 257.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Deductions as to speed from condition of two autos after collision were matters for jury.

1948 Millard v. Cohen, 187 Va. 44, 46 S.E.2d 2.Since the lawful rate of speed was 55 mph, no inference could be drawn from length of time elapsing from time parties left Petersburg until they reached scene of accident. Fact that defendant’s car was stopped 200 feet beyond point of impact did not justify any inference as to speed in this case.

1947 Gary v. Artist, 186 Va. 616, 43 S.E.2d 833.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Force of impact and gyrations of vehicle after impact indicate speed greater than was testified to.

1946 Slate v. Saul, 185 Va. 700, 40 S.E.2d 171.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Damage done to vehicle and distance vehicles traveled after impact indicated high rate of speed on part of defendant.

1945 Keen v. Harman, 183 Va. 670, 33 S.E.2d 197.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Engine and radiator hurled 20 feet from car. Physical facts justified inference that car traveling at considerable speed. No reasonable estimate of speed could be made from nature of tracks of vehicle.

1944 Richter v. Seawell, 183 Va. 379, 32 S.E.2d 62.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Distance that car traveled after going off road justifies inference that it was proceeding at considerable speed. This however does not establish gross negligence nor that speed was cause of accident.

1944 Perdue v. Patrick, 182 Va. 398, 29 S.E.2d 371.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Accuracy of estimate of speed may be verified or refuted based on physical evidence involved, i.e., skids, extent of property damage, distance travelled after impact.

1943 Moore v. Vick, 181 Va. 157, 24 S.E.2d 429.Physical facts sufficient to convict plaintiff of driving at rapid rate of speed.

1943 Willard Stores, Inc. v. Cornell, 181 Va. 143, 23 S.E.2d 761.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Fact that plaintiff pedestrian was found 18 inches from truck and in immediate vicinity of truck is conclusive proof that truck was not proceeding at rapid speed.

1943 Bell v. Kenney, 181 Va. 24, 23 S.E.2d 781.Although there is no oral testimony to establish that party was exceeding speed limit, where there is physical evidence of such, this will be sufficient to justify instruction on speed in excess of speed limit.

1942 Butler v. Greenwood, 180 Va. 456, 23 S.E.2d 217.Speed-inferences from other evidence.Question of admissibility of evidence of speed of auto at particular time as bearing upon its speed at another time, though on same journey, rests within discretion of trial court. Such questions should be resolved primarily on basis of difference in time of two speed determinations.

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